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CIRCUIT OVER TROUBLED WATERS: NINTH CIRCUIT
COMPARATIVE FAULT PRINCIPLES IN SEAMEN'S
PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS
Orland S. Seballos*
Abstract: Maritime personal injury actions employ the comparative fault doctrine, under
which damages are allocated between mutually negligent parties according to their
proportionate fault. This Comment focuses on recurring issues Ninth Circuit courts have faced
in this area: apportioning liability in cases of violations by seamen's employers of
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations, and determining whether to include
both causation and fault in making the apportionment. This Comment argues that the Ninth
Circuit should adopt rules consistent with the pronounced congressional and U.S. Supreme
Court policies of achieving uniformity in domestic and international admiralty and providing
liberal recovery for seamen.

Judicial application of the common law tort doctrine of comparative
fault to maritime actions is well-established.' The doctrine provides for
apportionment of damages among mutually negligent parties in2
proportion to their respective fault in causing injury or loss.
Comparative fault is intended to temper the harsh results of the
contributory negligence system, which precludes any recovery by
plaintiffs who are even minimally at fault.3 Courts apply the doctrine of
comparative fault in every maritime tort action, and admiralty is
considered a "pure" comparative negligence jurisdiction.4

LL.M., Admiralty, Tulane Law School, 1994.
1. See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1427-28 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that comparative
fault applies to unseaworthiness cases, actions under Jones Act, Death on High Seas Act, and
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); see also United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975) (abolishing divided damages rule in collision cases and replacing it with
comparative fault).
2. See Edward S.Digges, Jr. & Robert Dale Klein, ComparativeFault in Maryland: The Time
Has Come, 41 Md. L. Rev. 276, 278 (1982). The terms "comparative fault" and "comparative
negligence" are used interchangeably. Id. This Comment focuses on situations in which both seamen
and their employers are at fault.
3. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429 (1939). A plaintiff even one percent at
fault is barred from recovery under the common law contributory negligence rule. Henry Woods,
ComparativeFault § 1:3, at 7 (1978).
4. David R. Owen & J. Marks Moore III, ComparativeNegligence in Maritime PersonalInjury
Cases, 43 La. L. Rev. 941, 943 (1983); see also Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of
Admiralty 500 n.70 (2d ed. 1975) ("The admiralty rule in personal injury cases is, in effect, one of
comparative negligence.").
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Uniformity, which has always been an underlying concern in
admiralty, is necessary to facilitate maritime commerce and to apply
consistent remedies.' Presently, forty-six states have incorporated the
doctrine of comparative fault either by judicial decision or statute.'

Despite the persistent call for uniformity, different maritime courts have
interpreted the doctrine's many aspects in varied ways.
Courts have applied the doctrine of comparative fault inconsistently in
maritime actions where both the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent
and responsible for the damages suffered by the plaintiff.' Although the
U.S. Supreme Court has held that comparative fault applies in all
maritime tort actions,' the Court largely has left the interpretation and
application of facets of the doctrine to appellate and lower courts.
This Comment examines two rules the Ninth Circuit has applied when
allocating risk between a negligent seaman9 and a negligent defendant
employer in a maritime personal injury action." The first rule is the
Comparative fault exists in two forms: pure and modified. See Digges & Klein, supra note 2, at
279-81. Pure comparative fault jurisdictions permit a negligent plaintiff to recover even if his
negligence exceeds that of the defendant. Id. Modified comparative negligence jurisdictions enable a
negligent plaintiff to recover, provided that the plaintiff's negligence is not equal to or greater than
that of the defendant; otherwise, no recovery is permitted. Id.
5. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02 (1970) ("[U]niformity ... give[s]
effect to the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be 'a system of law
coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.") (citation omitted).
6. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830 (1996) (citing Brief for Respondent Hawaiian
Independent Refinery, Inc. [HIRI] at 28 & n.3 1, Sofec (No. 95-129)). These states are:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Respondent HIRI's Brief at app. A, Sofec (No. 95-129), available
in 1996 WL 53643.
7. Owen & Moore, supranote 4, at 942 ("Ihe state courts and legislatures generally have fallen
far short of constructing a complete doctrine [of comparative fault].").
8. See Sofec, 517 U.S. at 836-37.
9. "Seamen," as used in this Comment, refers to both male and female maritime workers who
have satisfied the test for seaman status that the U.S. Supreme Court has formulated: "First... an
employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of
its.., mission .... Second... a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an
identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in... duration and its nature." Harbor Tug &
Barge Co. v. Papai, 117 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1997).
10. The Ninth Circuit continues to be among the circuits having a high number of admiralty suits
litigated. In 1997, the American Maritime Cases (A.M.C.) Reporter published 60 cases from this
circuit, more than any other circuit that year.
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Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of "safety statutes," which, when
violated by the seaman's employer, preclude the employer from raising
the defense of the seaman's contributory negligence. The second rule,
followed by some courts in the Ninth Circuit, compares solely the fault
of the parties and ignores the causative impact of such fault when
allocating damages. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit's
restrictive interpretation of "safety statutes" fails to give seamen the
protection Congress intended. The Comment further argues that the
approach favored by lower courts in the Ninth Circuit-comparing fault
alone in their comparative fault analysis without considering proximate
cause-fails to meet the U.S. Supreme Court's goal of promoting
international uniformity in maritime law. Part I briefly reviews the
historical background of the comparative fault doctrine in maritime
personal injury actions. Parts II and III identify and analyze noteworthy
comparative fault issues that the Ninth Circuit has faced. Part IV
concludes that the Ninth Circuit should adopt rules regarding these issues
consistent with the pronounced objectives of Congress and the U.S.
Supreme Court.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The doctrine of comparative fault gradually appeared in the maritime
personal injury action context following the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in The Max Morris v. Curry." The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff longshoreman's contributory negligence did not bar his recovery
against the vessel for the negligence of its officers.' 2 Prior to this holding,
lower courts were divided on the question of whether a plaintiff could
recover for an injury caused by his own negligence when the vessel was
also at fault.' 3 The Court refused to decide, however, whether damages
should be divided equally between the parties pursuant to the divided
damages rule 4 or awarded in proportion to damages sustained

11. 137 U.S. 1(1890); Owen & Moore, supra note 4, at 943.
12. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. at 15.
13. Compare, e.g., The Explorer, 20 F. 135, 140 (E.D. La. 1884) (invoking court's discretion in
granting damages to negligent plaintiff on basis ofjustice and equity), with Peterson v. The Chandos,
4 F. 645, 649 (D. Or. 1880) (holding that negligent plaintiff cannot recover).
14. The "divided damages" rule in collision cases, which provides that damages should be equally
divided between the parties at fault irrespective of their degree of culpability, was enunciated in The
Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. 170 (1854), and later overruled by United States v.
Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 (1975). See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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respectively by them." Nevertheless, admiralty courts have cited
repeatedly The Max Morris for the proposition that comparative fault is
the applicable rule for maritime personal injury actions.' 6
In 1920, Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act, commonly
referred to as the Jones Act, 7 which governs seamen's personal injury
claims against their employers based on negligence. The Jones Act
explicitly incorporates the provisions of the 1908 Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA), 8 which applies to railroad workers. 9 While the
Jones Act makes no specific reference to comparative negligence, FELA
provides that "contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to such employee."2 Assumption of risk by the
employee is likewise unavailable as a defense and should not be
considered in apportionment of damages.2 ' The Jones Act's incorporation
of the FELA provision mandates the application of the comparative fault
doctrine in seamen's personal injury actions based on negligence.
Although The Max Morris and the Jones Act already established the
doctrine of comparative fault in personal injury actions, general
15. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. at 15.
16. Owen & Moore, supra note 4, at 943; see, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,
409 (1953) (citing The Max Morris for rule allowing consideration of contributory negligence in
mitigating damages); American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 458 (1947) ("Comparative
negligence is not unknown to our maritime law." (citing The Max Morris)); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.
v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 429 (1939) (citing rule in The Max Morris that seaman's contributory
negligence is not bar to recovery but only ground for mitigating damages); N.M. Patterson & Sons,
Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576, 590 (N.D. III. 1962) (citing The Max Morris in
apportioning damages based upon unequal degrees of contributory fault of parties); Webster v.
Davis, 109 F. Supp. 149, 153 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (citing The Max Morris in holding that admiralty
courts have consistently diminished damages to extent of contributory negligence).
17. Merchant Marine Act, ch. 250, 41 Stat 988 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 688 (1994)). The Jones Act's application is limited to "seamen," and only those who satisfy the
definition of this term can avail themselves of the remedies provided by the FELA-Jones Act
scheme. See supra note 9. Personal injury remedies of maritime workers other than seamen are
governed separately by other laws and are beyond the scope of this Comment. See infra note 130.
18. Federal Employers Liability Act, ch. 149. 35 Stat. 64 (1908) (codified as amended at 45
U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994)).
19. The Jones Act provides that "all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply." 46
U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
20. 45 U.S.C. § 53.
21. 45 U.S.C. § 54 ("[Wlhere such injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the negligence
of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier... no employee shall be held to have
assumed the risks of his employment in any case ....
").
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recognition of the doctrine's applicability to all maritime tort actions did
not occur until seventy-five years later. In United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., the Court discarded the centuries-old rule of equal division
of damages in collision cases and replaced it with the principle of
comparative fault.22 In doing so, the Court noted that major maritime
countries have moved toward the comparative fault regime. 3 Reliable
Transfer was limited to collision; yet, courts and admiralty scholars have
cited the case to support the proposition that comparative fault applies to
maritime torts in general.24 Admiralty courts have adopted the
comparative fault rule even in strict liability actions such as
unseaworthinesss and strict products liability 26 where the defendant's
liability is not predicated on fault.
II.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S LIMITED VIEW OF "SAFETY
STATUTES" AND ITS FAULT-ONLY APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE FAULT

The rule of comparative fault mandates that damages be allocated
between mutually negligent parties according to their proportionate fault.
As the rule of comparative fault continues to evolve, many facets of the
doctrine remain subject to academic discussion and debate. Practical
application of the rule has proved difficult, and the courts' struggles are
reflected in their varying interpretations. Two comparative fault issues
that have been the focus of judicial scrutiny in the Ninth Circuit are: (1)
the effect of an employer's violation of safety statutes or regulations on
the allocation of damages in a Jones Act action, and (2) the comparison
of both parties' fault and the causal connection between the fault and the

22. 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975). However, equal division of damages is still applicable when "it is
not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault." Id.
23. I. at 403-04 n.7.
24. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, § 3-4, at 110 n.1 (2d ed.
1994) ("In maritime tort cases where more than one party is responsible for an occurrence, liability
for damages is allocated among the parties proportionately according to the degree of their fault.")
(citing Reliable Transfer);see also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,
272 n.30 (1979) (citing Reliable Transfer in applying comparative fault in personal injury action
under Longshore & Harbor workers' Compensation Act); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1138 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying comparative fault rule in
Reliable Transferto strict products liability action).
25. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying comparative fault
doctrine in strict products liability action).
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injury in making the apportionment. The Ninth Circuit's prevailing rule
provides for a form of strict liability in a Jones Act action only when the
employer violates a Coast Guard regulation. Furthermore, most courts in
the Ninth Circuit tend to compare only the parties' fault in allocating
damages instead of comparing both fault and causation.
A.

Violation of Safety Statutes or Regulations by the Employer Results
in StrictLiability

1.

The Common Law Rule

Seamen invoking the negligence-based Jones Act remedy must show
that the employer was at fault, which may consist of either a breach of
the common law duty of care or a duty imposed by statute.27 Courts
generally recognize that an employer has a common law duty to exercise
reasonable care to provide a safe workplace.2 8 Statutes and regulations
imposing specific duties may create additional employer duties.29
In a majority of jurisdictions, a defendant's violation of a safety
statute or regulation that results in damage to another constitutes
negligence per se on the part of the defendant and relieves the plaintiff of
establishing duty and breach." The plaintiff must establish merely that
the breached statute or regulation seeks to prevent the kind of harm that
occurred and that the statute was designed to protect the class of persons
to which the plaintiff belongs.3' The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has
eliminated these requirements in maritime personal injury actions for
policy reasons.32

27. Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,432 (1958).
28. See, e.g., Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352 (1943) ("At common law the duty
of the employer to use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with a safe place to work was
plain.') (citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., Kernan, 355 U.S. at 431 (noting enactment of workmen compensation statutes to
bear the 'human overhead' of doing business").
30. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 36, at 229-30 (5th ed.
1984).
31. "[T]he violation of the enactment will not be negligence unless the harm which the violation
causes is that from which it was the purpose of the enactment to protect the others." Restatement
(Second)of Torts § 286 cmt. on clauses (c) and (d) (1965).
32. See infra Part ll.A.2.
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2.

The U.S. Supreme Court's Modification of the Common Law Rule

In Kernan v. American Dredging Co., the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed
the common law requirement that the violated statute or regulation must
have been promulgated to prevent the very harm that took place.33 In that
case, a seaman died in a fire caused by a lamp that was placed only three
feet above the water on the tugboat's deck.34 The placement of the lamp
was in violation of a U.S. Coast Guard regulation requiring the lamp to
be placed at least eight feet from the water's surface.3 5 The purpose of the
regulation was not to avoid fires, but to prevent collision by ensuring that
navigational lights were visible to other vessels.36 The seaman's
representative brought suit under the Jones Act.37 The issue on appeal
was whether the violation of a Coast Guard regulations imposed
negligence per se liability under FELA's section 51.38
The Court found that the link between the purpose of the statute and
the cause of the injury is irrelevant in actions brought under the Jones
Act, provided that the employer's fault caused the injury in whole or in
part.39 FELA section 51 provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny seaman
who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may... maintain an action for damages.. . and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law
right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply."4 Before Kernan, courts had interpreted FELA's section 51 to
impose such liability only in cases based on violations of the Safety
Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act.4 ' The Kernan Court,
however, focused on Congress's intent to liberalize recovery for seamen
and held that the mere violation of a Coast Guard regulation was
sufficient to find liability under the Jones Act.42
33. 355 U.S. 426.
34. Id. at 427.
35. Id. at 428.
36. Id.
37. Id.at431.
38. Id. at 430-31.
39. Id. at 438-39. The Court held that "the basis of liability is a violation of a statutory duty
without regard to whether the injury flowing from the violation was the injury the statute sought to
guard against." Id. at 438.
40. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
41. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 444 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 431-32.
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Deciding an action under the FELA-Jones Act scheme requires a twostep process: (1) finding the basis of liability, and (2) calculating the
amount of damages to which the seaman is entitled.43 A finding of
negligence per se liability by the employer under section 51 does not end
the matter because the courts, pursuant to section 53, must compare the
employer's fault with the seaman's to determine the amount of damages
the seaman can recover. While section 51 defines the basis of
defendants' liability for violation of safety statutes or regulations, section
53 instructs how damages should be allocated when the plaintiff is
contributorily negligent and the employer violates a safety statute or
regulation. Section 53 states in part:
[T]he fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished... in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to such employee; Provided, that no such employee
who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of
contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such
common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of the
employees contributed to the injury or death.'
Thus, section 53 provides an instance when the doctrine of comparative
fault would not apply.
Kernan answered the first part of the inquiry-whether the employer's
violation of safety statutes or regulations, including Coast Guard
regulations, results in negligence per se liability under section 51 as long
as the violation caused the injury.45 By modifying the common law
requirement, the Court reduced seamen's burden in establishing
employer liability when the employer's negligence consists of a violation
of a statute or regulation that proximately caused the injury. It left open
the question, however, of what constitutes a "statute enacted for the
safety of the employees,"4 6 a violation of which amounts to a form of
strict liability under FELA section 53.

43.
44.
45.
46.
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3.

Disagreementon the InterpretationofSection 53

Courts that have interpreted what constitutes a "statute enacted for the
safety of employees" under section 53 of FELA have arrived at different
results. The Ninth Circuit has refused to consider Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA)47 regulations as safety statutes within the
contemplation of FELA's section 53 in cases involving seamen. In
contrast, the First and Fourth Circuits, in non-maritime cases, treat noncompliance of OSHA regulations as violation of safety rules, resulting in
a form of strict liability under section 53.
a.

The Ninth Circuit'sRestrictiveInterpretationofFELA Section 53

In allocating damages between a seaman and the seaman's employer
when both are guilty of negligence in producing the seaman's injury, the
Ninth Circuit has read FELA section 53 restrictively. Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit has eschewed the form of strict liability mandated by this
provision when the employer's negligence consisted of violating a
regulation promulgated pursuant to OSHA. The Ninth Circuit finds
support for such an interpretation in the language of OSHA itself.
The Ninth Circuit anchors its exclusion of OSHA regulations from the
ambit of section 53 on OSHA's preemption provision." OSHA
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational
standards to assure safe and healthy working conditions for industry
workers.4 9 However, section 653(b)(1) of OSHA exempts the statute's
application where other federal and qualified state agencies have
promulgated rules governing the working conditions of particular groups
of employees." Because of this provision, some courts, including the
Ninth Circuit, have questioned OSHA's applicability when the
employees' working condition does not fall under the Secretary of
5
Labor's domain. l

47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 558-59 (1984).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).
50. "Nothing in this chapter shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect to which
other Federal agencies, and State agencies acting under section 2021 of title 42, exercise statutory
authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health." 29
U.S.C. § 653(b)(1).
51. See, e.g., Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 1985) (discussing
district court's basis for denial of plaintiff's injury instruction on negligence and contributory
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In Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline,the Ninth Circuit held that in cases
involving seamen, OSHA regulations are not the kind of statutes or
regulations contemplated by FELA section 53.52 This frustrated the
seaman's attempt for total recovery of the damages he suffered despite
his own contributory negligence. 3 Kopczynski involved an employer's
violation of an OSHA regulation governing the use of ladders for access
to vessels.' The Ninth Circuit faced the question of whether such
violation precludes consideration of the seaman's contributory
negligence in his Jones Act action." The court, however, refused to
resolve the issue.56 In so doing, the court noted OSHA's preemption
language.57 The court recognized that the Coast Guard is the lead agency
charged with regulating the working conditions of seamen like the
Kopczynski plaintiff. 8 OSHA regulations, the court rationalized, are
therefore inapplicable to the case even though no Coast Guard regulation
governs the use of ladders. 59 Because one cannot violate statutes or
regulations that do not apply to him or her, the employer in Kopczynski
did not violate OSHA. Consequently, the seaman's employer was not
subject to FELA section 53 strict liability. Thus, the Ninth Circuit
implied that only violations of Coast Guard regulations trigger
application of section 53 strict liability in seamen's Jones Act actions.
Subsequently, in Fuszek v. Royal King Fisheries, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit held that an employer's violation of a Coast Guard regulation
prevents the court from reducing the seaman's damages.' This case
involved a Coast Guard regulation requiring all exposed machinery on
board a vessel to have suitable hand covers.6' The Ninth Circuit found

negligence); Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 558-59 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that seamen cannot invoke
employer's OSHA violation because OSHA was not enacted for seamen's benefit).
52. Kopczynski, 742 F.2d at 558-59.
53. Id. at 557.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 557-58.
56. Id. at 558.
57. Id. at 558-59.
58. Id. at 559.
59. Although the court did not explicitly find that no existing Coast Guard regulation governed
the use of ladders to access vessels, a perusal of Coast Guard regulations reveals that no such
regulation covers this type of situation.
60. 98 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1334 (1997).
61. 46 C.F.R. § 28.215(b) (1995) provides, in relevant part, that "[s]uitable hand covers.., must
be installed in way of machinery which can cause injury to personnel."
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the employer fully liable and refused to reduce the negligent seaman's
damages.62 The appellate court distinguished Fuszek's facts from
Kopczynski by stating that the Kopczynski plaintiff could have recovered
in full had the employer's negligence stemmed from a violation of a
Coast Guard regulation.63 Thus, the Ninth Circuit read the language in
FELA section 53, precluding consideration of the seaman's contributory
negligence when the employer had violated a "statute enacted for the
safety of employees," as applying to Coast Guard regulations only.
Other Circuits'Broad Reading ofFELA Section 53

b.

Other circuits that have addressed the interplay between FELA section
53 and OSHA in a non-maritime context have reached results contrary to
the Ninth Circuit. In doing so, these circuits looked to both the language
of FELA and the legislative intent behind FELA and OSHA.
The Fourth Circuit in Southern Railway Co. v. OccupationalSafety &
Health Review Commission interpreted OSHA's preemption provision as
applying only in instances when another federal agency has actually
exercised its authority in that particular situation.' The employer in that
case was a railway company charged with violating OSHA standards
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.65 Questioning its liability, the
employer reasoned that, under the language of section 653(b)(1), and
because only the Secretary of Transportation possesses jurisdiction over
the working conditions of railway employees, the employer was not
bound by OSHA regulations.66 The court looked at both the language of
the statute and its legislative history and rejected the employer's
argument. It noted that Congress had rejected earlier OSHA legislation
versions providing that the mere existence of statutory authority in
another federal agency was sufficient to invoke the exemption.67 During
the House debate, however, it became apparent that the actual exercise of
authority, rather than its mere existence, was the event contemplated to
trigger OSHA's preemption. 6' Additionally, the court noted that the Act's

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Fuszek, 98 F.3d at 515.
Id. at 517.
539 F.2d 335, 336 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id.
Id.

67. Id. at 336-37 (citation omitted).
6S. Id. at 337.
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declared purpose was "to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to
preserve our human resources." 6 9 Based on the Act's history and the
policy behind its enactment, the Fourth Circuit concluded that OSHA
regulations apply absent the governing agency's active exercise of
70

authority.

Likewise, in Pratico v. PortlandTerminal Co. the First Circuit held
that an employer's violation of an OSHA regulation renders the
employee's negligence irrelevant in computing damages.7' Pratico
involved a railroad employee who claimed injury as a result of his
employer's use of equipment in violation of OSHA regulations. The trial
court found the plaintiff eighty percent contributorily negligent and
reduced the damages he recovered in accordance with this finding.72 The
plaintiff appealed, claiming entitlement to the full amount of damages
awarded under section 53 of FELA.73 The question was whether OSHA
regulations qualify as a statute enacted for employees' safety, which,
when violated by the employer, renders the employee's negligence
irrelevant in determining the amount of damages under section 53. In
answering the question in the affirmative, the First Circuit initially
looked to the congressional record to determine how section 53 should
be construed.74 Finding nothing in the record to indicate to the contrary,
the court concluded that Congress must have intended that the statute's
plain meaning be given effect.75 Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's
reading of FELA in Kernan, the court stressed that nothing clearly
indicated that Congress sought to limit the coverage or definition of
statutes and regulations "enacted for the safety of employees. 7 6 Without

69. Id. at 338 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1972)).
70. Id. at336-38.
71. 783 F.2d 255, 267-68 (Ist Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 257.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 267.
75. Id. at 267-68. An examination of the congressional record on the passage of FELA shows
only one statement referring to section 53: "The proviso in section [53] is to the effect that
contributory negligence shall not be charged to the employee, if he is injured or killed by reason of
the violation, by the employer, of any statute enacted for the safety of the employees." H.R Rep. No.
60-1380, at 6 (1908).
76. Pratico,783 F.2d at 267.
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such clear indication, the First Circuit refused to indulge in judicial

legislation."
The First Circuit then addressed other courts' limited reading of
section 53. Prior to Kernan, many courts had restricted a finding of
negligence per se liability to violations of statutes and regulations already
existing at the time of FELA's enactment, namely the Safety Appliance
Act and the Boiler Inspection Act.78 In holding such restrictive reading of
section 53 erroneous, the court reasoned that safety statutes other than
the Safety Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act have been found
to be within the contemplation of this provision.79 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that other federal laws, like the Hours of Service Act, also
fall within the contemplation of section 53." The First Circuit noted that,
although Congress enacted the Boiler Inspection Act three years after
FELA's enactment, there was no question that a violation of this Act
triggered the application of section 53.81 Thus, Congress could not have
intended to limit safety statutes under section 53 to particular statutes in
existence at the time of FELA's enactment. 2

77. Id. ("without a clear indication from the legislative history that Congress meant anything
other than what the statute plainly says, i.e., that the violation of any safety statute shall have this
effect, we see no reason to assume that the application of the proviso is in any way limited.").
78. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163. 189 (1949) (holding that railway employees
suffering injuries in consequence of violation of safety regulations promulgated under either Safety
Appliance Act or Boiler Inspection Act could maintain action under FELA without reference to law
of negligence); accordCarter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430 (1949) (holding
that once violation of Safety Appliance Act is established, only causal relation is at issue);
O'Donnell v. Elgin, 338 U.S. 384 (1949) (same).
79. Pratico,783 F.2d at 267.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. In a 1998 case, Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., the First Circuit again faced the issue of an
employer's negligence per se liability when an OSHA violation is involved. 134 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1998). The court held that the violation constitutes "a mere evidence of negligence" and not
negligence per se. Id. at 5. The court, however, distinguished this case from Pratico on the ground
that this latter case involved a cause of action that arose under state common law, while Praticodealt
with a claim under FELA. Id. at 4-5. Moreover, in Elliott, unlike in Pratico,there was no allegation
of plaintiff's contributory negligence. Thus, Praticocontinues to be the authority in the First Circuit.
Although Southern Railway and Pratico are non-maritime cases, they remain relevant in
discerning the relationship between FELA-Jones Act and OSHA regulations. See supra notes 17-21
and accompanying text (discussing Jones Act's incorporation of FELA provisions). This is
especially true in cases involving seamen when only OSHA regulations apply.
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AdministrativeAttempts to DelineateAuthority

4.

In an attempt to clear the confusion and overlap between the Coast
Guard and the Department of Labor's jurisdiction over seamen's
working conditions, the two agencies signed a Memorandum of
Understanding in 1983.83 This attempt, however, does not adequately
address the question of OSHA's applicability in instances involving
seamen when no Coast Guard regulation governs.
Pursuant to the 1983 Memorandum, in 1996 the Department of Labor
issued OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.2084 to clarify further the
jurisdictional conflict between the Coast Guard and the Department of
Labor. The labor department emphasized that in accordance with
OSHA's preemption provision, the Coast Guard exercises statutory
authority to provide and enforce statutes and regulations affecting the
safety and health of seamen on board "inspected" vessels." OSHA
regulations continue to regulate working conditions on "uninspected"
vessels (other than commercial fishing vessels) that are not otherwise
covered by Coast Guard standards.86 Moreover, OSHA standards remain
enforceable on inspected vessels for maritime workers other than seamen
when no specific Coast Guard regulations apply.87 The instructions,
however, fail to clarify what standards are applicable to seamen on
inspected vessels if the hazard is not specifically subject to a particular
Coast Guard regulation, leaving no clear rule to govern this situation.
Courts continue to grapple with the issue of allocating damages
between negligent plaintiffs and defendants as a result of the U.S.
Supreme Court's failure to define when the defendant's negligence
consists of violation of a statute or regulation under a FELA cause of
action. Circuits disagree on the correct relationship between OSHA
regulations and FELA under these circumstances. In the maritime
context, questions persist about what rules apply to seamen when no
83. See 48 Fed. Reg. 11,365-66 (1983).
84. OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20 (Nov. 8, 1996).
85. OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20(L), at 8. "Inspected vessel" is defined as a vessel subject to
inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard under 46 U.S.C. § 3301 and issued a Certificate of Inspection
(COI) by the Coast Guard. OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20(H)(I0), at 5.
86. OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20(R), at 14. "Uninspected vessel" means a vessel that is not
subject to inspection under 46 U.S.C. § 3301 and not a recreational vessel under 46 U.S.C.
§ 2101(43). OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20(H)(13), at 5. An "uninspected vessel" is subject to
limited Coast Guard inspection in specific areas. Id.
87. OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20(L)(2).
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Coast Guard, but only OSHA, regulations are in place. This is so despite
administrative attempts to develop a coherent rule.
B.

Comparison of Degree of Culpabilityand Proximate Causation

1.

Two Approaches to Comparing "Fault"

The phrase "comparative fault" raises the question of what must be
compared. In United States v. Reliable Transfer, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that liability will be apportioned among the parties in proportion to
their degree of fault.88 However, the Court did not define the word
"fault" and left the lower courts to address the issue.
The ongoing debate in general tort law regarding the factors to be
analyzed in a comparative fault system89 has carried over to maritime
personal injury actions. Commentators and scholars have advanced two
approaches to implement the Court's instructions in apportioning
liability. The first approach compares the degree of the respective
parties' culpable conduct.9" Under this approach, the facffinder's task is
to allocate a larger percentage of fault, or culpability, to the party whose
conduct is found to be more blameworthy. 9 The second approach,
known as the British rule, compares the parties' conduct as well as the
conduct's causative effect.9' Thus, one examines each party's culpable
conduct, and also the extent to which such conduct caused the injury.93
Consider the following hypothetical. Vessel V was forced to dock at
one end of the pier to undergo emergency repairs that were expected to
last for not more than twelve hours. The malfunctioning of the xvessel

88. 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
89. See generally Woods, supranote 3.
90. David P. Owen & M. Hamilton Whitman, Jr., Fifteen Years Under Reliable Transfer: 19751990 Developments in American Maritime Law in Light ofthe Rule of ComparativeFault,22 . Mar.
L. & Com. 445, 476-77 (1991).
91. Id. at 476. A party whose conduct is more blameworthy must also be a cause in fact of the
damage. Id.
92. Id. at477.
93. Id. There are two types of causation: cause-in-fact ("[t]hat particular cause which produces an
event and without which the injury would not have occurred") and proximate cause ("[tihat which,
in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred"). Black's Law Dictionary221, 1225 (6th ed.
1990). Cause-in-fact is considered an absolute concept and therefore incapable of apportionment
Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 67, at 474. Proximate causation is compared for purposes of
comparative fault. Id.
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was not caused by the crew of the vessel and did not exist when the
vessel was thoroughly inspected before undertaking the voyage. A vessel
that had been burning for three hours was at the other end of the pier. S,
the seaman who was to repair V, was required by the nature of her work
to wear protective gear. A sudden shift of wind cause the fire to spread
quickly in V's direction and V eventually caught fire. At the time of the
accident, S was not wearing her protective gear despite repeated
warnings to do so. S suffered bums and sued her employer, E, claiming
negligence for docking the vessel at the burning pier. It was established
that S's injuries could have been prevented if she had been wearing her
protective gear. Using the fault or culpability alone analysis, S's recovery
(assuming she could recover at all) would be greatly diminished by her
own failure to protect herself. Looking at both fault and causation,
however, may yield a different result. Under this approach, the court will
determine whether E's negligence in docking at the burning pier was a
proximate cause of S's injury. If E's negligence is a proximate cause of
S's damage, the court will then weigh the causative impact of E's
negligence in exposing the vessel to harm against S's own negligence in
failing to protect herself, and apportion damages accordingly. The court
may find that although S is guilty of contributory fault, the injury could
have been prevented had E docked somewhere else. Thus, under the
second approach, S has a better chance of recovering and obtaining a
substantial award.
2.

The Ninth Circuit'sBias Toward the "FaultAlone" Approach

Ninth Circuit district courts favor the "culpability alone" analysis.
This approach was employed by the district court in Pan-Alaska
Fisheries,Inc. v. Marine Construction & Design Co., the first case to
address the issue after the Reliable Transfer decision. In Pan-Alaska, the
court stated that damages in comparative negligence cases are assessed
based on the standard of culpability, not causation.9 5

94. 402 F. Supp. 1187 (W.D. Wash. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 565 F.2d 1129 (9th
Cir. 1977).
95. Id. at 1188. In so ruling, the court relied on Dean Schwartz's statement in his treatise,
ComparativeNegligence, that the "line of inquiry under comparative negligence does not focus on
physical causation; rather, it considers and weighs culpability." Id.The court erroneously claimed
that the Court cited this treatise in Reliable Transfer. Owen & Whitman, supra note 90, at 478-79.
The same court reiterated this interpretation of Reliable Transfer in Alaska Packers Ass 'n v. 0/S East
Point, 421 F. Supp. 48,53 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
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On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's
decision in Pan-Alaska.96 The appellate court held that the term
"comparative causation" is probably a more accurate term than
"comparative fault" because mere fault without causation will not subject
a party to liability.97 It then concluded that the choice of the precise term
is not as important as reaching the ultimate objective of equitably
allocating responsibility for loss or injury.98
Thus, although the Ninth Circuit seems to recognize the importance of
comparing causation, it has stopped short of requiring an approach that
compares both fault and causation.9 9 To date, the Ninth Circuit has failed
to articulate a clear rule that outlines the factors lower courts must
consider when allocating fault in the maritime context. The Ninth
Circuit's language in Pan-Alaska notwithstanding, cases subsequently
decided by lower courts appear to favor comparing culpability only.'
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD ADOPT PRINCIPLES
CONSISTENT WITH JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE POLICIES
In applying the principle of comparative fault in seamen's personal
injury actions, Ninth Circuit courts have adopted rules that do not
advance legislative and judicial policies. The Ninth Circuit's refusal to
extend full protection to seamen when their employers have violated
OSHA rather than Coast Guard regulations defeats congressional intent
of liberalizing recovery under the FELA-Jones Act statutes.' Likewise,
the Ninth Circuit courts' preferred approach of solely comparing the
parties conduct, instead of both the conduct and its causative effects, is
unrealistic and in conflict with the approach that has been adopted by
another historically acknowledged maritime power, Great Britain.0 2

96. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
97. Id. at 1139.
98. Id.
99. Owen & Whitman, supra note 90, at 479 (noting that despite Ninth Circuit's apparent
recognition of comparative causation in Pan-Alaska, Ninth Circuit courts still appear to favor
apportionment of culpability alone in later cases).
100. See, e.g., Port of Seattle v. MIV Saturn, 562 F. Supp. 70,74 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (holding that
culpability, not degree of causation, is basis for apportioning liability); Alaska Packers,421 F. Supp.
at 53 (same).
101. See S. Rep. No. 40-60, at 4527 (1908).
102. See Arran Transp. Co. v. S/T Maria Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621, 636 n.1 1 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
("In adopting the comparative fault rule, the Supreme Court [in Reliable Transfer] noted that it was
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The Ninth Circuit should adopt a rule that applies strict liability to an
employer's OSHA violations under FELA's section 53 when no Coast
Guard regulation applies to the particular condition. This rule is
supported by the plain language of FELA, the requirement that different
sections of the statute be read together, and the special protection courts
and Congress have traditionally extended to seamen. Moreover, an
approach that compares both conduct and causation is more pragmatic
and promotes uniformity by being in harmony with the British rule.
A.

Violation of OSHA Regulations,Absent Applicable Coast Guard
Regulations,Should Create Strict Liability

While Kernan established that an employer's violation of any safety
statute or regulation triggers strict liability under section 51 of FELA, it
did not reach the question of what constitutes a "statute enacted for the
safety of employees" under FELA section 53.03 The two Ninth Circuit
decisions addressing the issue, Kopczynski and Fuszek, have impliedly
limited their section 53 "statute enacted for the safety of employees"
definition to regulations promulgated by the Coast Guard."°4 This
interpretation excludes regulations adopted pursuant to OSHA even in
instances when no Coast Guard regulations apply. Given FELA's
language and the special solicitude Congress and the courts have
historically extended to seamen, the Ninth Circuit should adopt a broad
following the lead of the world's other... maritime nations and particularly noted the adoption of
such a rule by Great Britain in the Maritime Conventions Act [of] 1911 ....
").
The Brussels Liability Convention of 1910 adopted the doctrine of comparative fault in maritime
casualties. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to
Collision Between Vessels, Sept. 23, 1910, art. 4, in 6 Benedict on Admiralty 3-11 (7th rev. ed.
1998). The Court in Reliable Transfer noted that the countries that have ratified or adhered to the
Convention include traditional maritime powers like Great Britain, the Netherlands, France,
Germany, Canada, and Japan. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 404 n.7 (1975).
The British Maritime Conventions Act of 1911 was enacted to carry into effect the 1910 Convention.
Henry V. Brandon, Apportionment of Liability in British Courts Under the Maritime Conventions
Act of 1911, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 1025, 1026 (1977). The British approach of comparing both fault and
causation is reflected in this Act. Id. at 1031-32. Some commentators have acknowledged that the
British rule is the authoritative interpretation of the 1910 Convention. Owen & Whitman, supranote
90, at 477. At least one country that is a signatory to the 1910 Convention has comparative fault
rules similar to Britain's. See Hawaii-Santa Fe Pioneers Arbitration, 1968 A.M.C. 602, 611 (1968)
(Underwood, Arb.) (noting Japan's acknowledgment that Japanese comparative fault rules are
similar to Great Britain's).
103. See supraPart H.A; see also Keman v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,428 (1958).
104. See supra Part II.A; Fuszek v. Royal King Fisheries, Inc., 98 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 117 S.Ct. 1334 (1997); Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984).
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reading of both the statute and Kernan to include OSHA violations as
precluding seamen's employers from raising the seamen's contributory
fault when no Coast Guard regulations are in place.
1.

Reading Kernan Broadly Does Not Violate the Language ofFELA

The starting point in analyzing a case involving statutory construction
is the statute's language itself.' FELA does not define what a "statute
enacted for the safety of the employees" is for the purpose of section 53.
The language of the statutory provision is, however, broad enough to
encompass statutes such as OSHA. The provision imposes no restrictions
on the kind of statute or regulation that triggers section 53's proviso
when violated. The only requirements under section 53 are that the
violated statute or regulation be enacted for safety purposes and that the
violation is a factor in causing the injury." 6 This section should not be
interpreted in a way other than the way it is written.'0 7
The Ninth Circuit should adopt a reading of section 53 that is faithful
to the statute's plain language. The language Congress selected to
determine the amount of damages recoverable in cases of this kind is
simple and direct, and absent a clear indication from Congress to read it
otherwise, section 53 must be interpreted as encompassing violations by
the employer of OSHA regulations.'
2.

The Ninth CircuitShould Read Sections 51 and 53 Harmoniously

Different parts of a statute should be construed as harmoniously and
consistently as possible to give effect to the overall statutory scheme." 9
Kernan is crucial in this regard. Although that case addressed only the
issue of employer liability under FELA section 51, the Kernan Court's
105. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
106. See supralanguage of 45 U.S.C. § 53 in text accompanying note 44.
107. Pratico v. Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 267-68 (1st Cir. 1985).
108. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("[T]he meaning of a statute must, in
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain.... the
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."); see also Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 278-79 (1977) (holding that courts must reject "theory that
nowhere appears in the [statute], that was never mentioned by Congress during the legislative
process, that does not comport with Congress's intent, and that restricts ... a remedial [statute]").
109. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535 (1980); see also International Mercantile Marine
Co. v. Lowe, 93 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1938) (construing Longshoremen & Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act).
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liberal reading of section 51 is significant in determining fault allocation
under section 53.
Kernan established the rule that a violation of any safety statute or
regulation results in negligence per se liability under section 51
regardless of the purpose for which the statute or regulation was
enacted."' The inclusiveness of this provision should be a guide in
determining the kinds of statutes and regulations that would prevent the
application of comparative fault under section 53. In ascertaining
FELA's objective, the Court looked at section 51 and also examined the
statutory scheme in its entirety."' Thus, the Court's finding of
congressional objective to allow workers easier recovery against their
negligent employers is relevant in interpreting all sections of FELA."
Sections 51 and 53 should be read together to give the statute a
consistent interpretation.
3.

Construing OSHA Regulations as Safety Regulations Supports
Special Protectionof Seamen

Seamen have traditionally received the generosity of Congress and the
courts. The special protection this class of workers enjoys is reflected in
both the congressional intent behind the passage of the FELA-Jones Act
scheme, which is to liberalize avenues for seamen's recovery, and the
way the courts have fashioned common law remedies in seamen's
personal injury actions.
A broad reading of section 53 that considers OSHA regulations in the
absence of applicable Coast Guard regulations would give effect to the
legislative intent behind the promulgation of the FELA-Jones Act
scheme. FELA was Congress's response to what it perceived as the
inadequate protection afforded under the common law regime to industry
workers." 3 In enacting FELA, Congress envisioned a remedy that would
be flexible enough to reflect the industry's increasing responsibility

110. Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426,438-39 (1958).
111. Id. (examining statute as whole in ascertaining its objective).
112. See infra Part III.A.3.
113. The law was enacted because the Congress was dissatisfied with the common-law duty of
the master to his servant The statute supplants that duty with the far more drastic duty of paying
damages for injury or death at work due in whole or in part to the employer's negligence. The
employer is stripped of his common law defenses ....
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1957) (footnote omitted).
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towards its workers." 4 Threats to workers' health and safety that did not
previously exist and therefore could not have been contemplated by
existing statutes and regulations continue to arise. The U.S. Supreme
Court recognized this when it debunked an interpretation of section 51 of
FELA that limited a finding of negligence per se to violation of statutes
existing at the time of FELA's enactment." 5 As conditions in the
workplace change and workers are unceasingly exposed to a multitude of
hazards in the performance of their duties, FELA-Jones Act remedies
should not remain static but should continue to adapt to changing
circumstances." 6
The Ninth Circuit rule-that seamen cannot benefit from the section
53 proviso when the employer violates OSHA regulations even when
OSHA regulations are the only rules that seamen can invoke" 7 -- thwarts
Congress's intent to provide liberal avenues for recovery under the Jones
Act. The fact that the Coast Guard has sole authority over seamen"'
should not preclude the application of OSHA's benefit to this class of
workers. Coast Guard regulations do not cover the entire field of
seamen's working conditions." 9 Preventing OSHA regulations from
filling this void contravenes the very essence of section 53. The Coast
Guard's failure to regulate a particular working condition should not
operate to excuse the employer's violation of another statute or
regulation intended to ensure safe working conditions.' 20 To give effect
to Congress's intent to liberalize recovery, courts should not limit
seamen's recovery based on the source of the violated regulation. The
critical fact is that the employer failed to provide a reasonably safe

114. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 432.
115. Id. at 436-39.
116. Id. at 432 (holding that instead of detailed statutes codifying common law principles,
Congress, in FELA and Jones Act, enacted statutes of most general terms, leaving in large measure
duty of fashioning remedies for injured employees to courts).
117. See Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555, 558-59 (1984) (rejecting seaman's
contention that court should disregard his contributory negligence in allocating damages when
employer violated OSHA regulation, even if no Coast Guard regulation applies to plaintiff's

situation).
118. See OSHA Instruction CPL 2-1.20 (Nov. 8, 1996) (delineating authority between Coast
Guard and Department of Labor over working conditions in vessels).
119. For example, no existing Coast Guard regulations concern the use of ladders to access
vessels.
120. Southern Ry. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 539 F.2d 335, 339 (4th
Cir. 1976) (holding that OSHA's preemption by another federal agency should operate only when

that federal agency has actually exercised its regulatory authority).
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Therefore, where the Coast Guard has not exercised its

rulemaking authority, OSHA violations should trigger section 53 liability
for the employer.

Disregarding seamen's contributory negligence in apportioning
damages upon proof of an OSHA violation by the employer when no
Coast Guard regulations apply is also consistent with the special
solicitude that courts have traditionally extended to seamen. Courts
regard Jones Act seamen as wards of the admiralty by virtue of the

extremely unique perils and hardships that a seaman's life requires.'
Working long hours in adverse weather conditions, being away from
their families for months, and lacking the usual means of recreation have
been traditional characteristics of seamen's life."z The various remedies
available only to seamen in the case of personal injury and death reflect
the courts' paternalistic attitude. Liability based on the traditional
common law doctrine of unseaworthiness' is absolute and does not
depend on a showing by the plaintiff of the ship owner's negligence."

Strict products liability,'26 which has recently been held as an available

remedy in maritime actions, likewise does not require the plaintiff to

prove negligence. 27 Under another common law remedy, maintenance
and cure, 28 seamen who are contributorily negligent are still entitled to
recovery, as long as their fault does not rise to the level of willful

misconduct.

29

Except for strict products liability, these remedies are

exclusive to seamen and do not extend to other maritime workers such as
121. Kernan, 355 U.S. at 438 (declaring that basis for negligence per se liability under FELA is
employer's violation of statutory duty to provide safe workplace, regardless of whether resulting
injuries were those statute sought to protect).
122. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367,377 (1932).
123. In Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, the Court recognized that unlike their land-based
counterparts, seamen are exposed to "perils of the sea and the risks of unseaworthiness, with little
opportunity to avoid those dangers or... protect themselves." 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946).
124. Liability for unseaworthiness lies when the shipowner violates an "implied warranty that the
vessel is reasonably fit for its intended purpose." Schoenbaum, supra note 24, § 3-9, at 143.
125. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539,549 (1960).
126. An action for strict products liability requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the defendant
sold or manufactured the product, (2) the product was unreasonably dangerous or was in a defective
condition when it left the defendant's control, and (3) the defect resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
127. See East River S.S. Corp. v. TransAmerica DeLaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986).
128. "Maintenance" is defined as the seamen's right to food and lodging if they become ill while
serving, whereas "cure" refers to the right to medical services that injured or sick seamen need.
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938).
129. Schoenbaum, supra note 24, § 4-3 1, at 297.

1156

Comparative Fault in Seamen's Actions
the longshoremen and harbor-workers. 3 ° Thus, seamen, compared to
other maritime workers, have the most far-reaching rights. 3'
The Supreme Court has periodically reaffirmed this idea of special
protection for seamen in its maritime decisions. Early cases recognized
that seamen have to endure the harshness of long voyages and perils of
the sea to earn their keep.' 32 Unlike their land-based counterparts who
may have wider options, seamen have no choice but to endure unsafe
working conditions while at sea.'33 The Court has also ruled that the
seamen's burden of proving causation in a Jones Act suit is
"featherweight"--less than what is required in ordinary tort actions.' 34
Accordingly, the Court has liberally construed remedial legislation such
as the Jones Act to enlarge, rather than narrow, the protection it
provides.' 35 In allocating fault under section 53 of FELA in maritime
personal injury actions, the Ninth Circuit should thus give due
consideration to the special treatment that seamen have always enjoyed.

130. The remedies available to longshoremen and harbor workers are spelled out in the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994).
131. Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure remedies are exclusive to seamen
(see supra note 9 for who qualifies as "seamen") and do not extend to other maritime workers. See
Desper v. Starve Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187, 190 (1952) (refusing to extend Jones Act remedy to
maritime worker not satisfying "seaman" status at time of death); Normille v. Maritime Co. of the
Phil., 643 F.2d 1380, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding unseaworthiness cause of action unavailable
to longshore and harbor workers subject to LHWCA); IB Benedict on Admiralty § 44, at 4-10 (7th
rev. ed. 1998) ("[A]nyone classified as a Jones Act seaman can bring an action for maintenance and
cure....") (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1939); Calmar
Steamship Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122-23
(1936).
133. Although early courts' characterization of seamen's plight as lacking adequate protection
and having limited freedom of choice when confronted with unfavorable working conditions (in
contrast to land-based employees) may not necessarily hold true in present times, modem court
decisions continue to echo the special policy. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354-55
(1995) (tracing development of heightened legal protection given to seamen who, "by the peculiarity
of their lives [are] liable to sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and
exhausting labour"); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354 (1991) (stating that
"[t]raditional seamen's remedies ... have been 'universally recognized as ...growing out of the
status of the seaman and his peculiar relationship to the vessel, and as a feature of the maritime law
compensating or offsetting the special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go down to sea
in ships are subjected') (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting)); Wink v. Rowan Drilling Co., 611 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1980) (subjecting releases
or settlements involving seamen's rights to careful scrutiny because seamen are wards of admiralty).
134. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957) (relying on Court's
previous interpretation of FELA in Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957)).
135. The Arizona, 298 U.S. at 123.
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Given FELA's straightforward language and the desirability of
interpreting different sections of statutes consistently, the Ninth Circuit
should consider the employer's violation of OSHA regulations, when no
Coast Guard regulations apply, to preclude such employers from raising
the seamen's contributory negligence as a defense to diminish recovery.
The preferential treatment that Congress and the courts have traditionally
given to seamen also supports this interpretation of FELA.
B.

ComparingFaultand Proximate Causation

Deciding which factors to compare-fault and causation or fault
alone-in a comparative fault scheme remains a thorny problem among
the courts. Ninth Circuit courts apparently favor an approach that
compares fault alone.'36 Adopting a rule that compares not only the
parties' culpable conduct but also causation would advance the goal of
international uniformity, which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed in
Reliable Transfer.'37 Moreover, in most cases, facts underlying the fault
and causation queries are so intertwined that asking the jury to consider
one but not the other presents a formidable task.'38
1.

ComparingBoth FaultandProximate Causation Will Advance the
Objective of InternationalUniformity

Reliable Transfer was the U.S. Supreme Court's attempt to keep
American maritime law consistent with the law of England, which has
traditionally been the world's other maritime power. 3 9 The Court noted
that England has abandoned the "divided damages" rule 4 ' and adopted
the Brussels Liability Convention of 1910, which provides for
apportionment of damages according to the degree of fault if the facts so
require. 4' The Court lamented that among the world's leading maritime

136. See supraPart lI.B.2.
137. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,403-04 (1975).
138. Afran Transp. Co. v. S/T Maria Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621, 636 n.11 (noting direct
relationship between degree of culpability and degree of causation); Owen & Whitman, supra note
90, at 481 ("In most cases it may make little difference which factors are considered, because the
degree of culpability will have a direct relationship to the degree of causation.") (citing Afran
Transp., 450 F. Supp. at 636-37).
139. Reliable Transfer,421 U.S. at 403-04.
140. See supranote 14 and accompanying text.
141. Reliable Transfer,421 U.S. at 403.
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nations, the United States was virtually alone in diverging from the
Convention's rule of proportional fault. 4 ' The Court pointed out that the
divergence resulted in the undesirable practice of transoceanic forum
shopping.'4 3 The desire for international uniformity was one of the
compelling reasons why American maritime law is now a pure
comparative fault regime.'"
In applying the Brussels Convention, English courts have adopted an
interpretation of the comparative fault rule that compares both culpability
and causation.'45 The Reliable Transfer Court emphatically noted that all
major maritime nations except the U.S. have adhered to the proportional
fault rule of the Convention.'46 Given the English courts' interpretation
of the comparative fault rule as requiring a dual analysis of fault and
causation, and the U.S. courts' concern for uniformity, it is reasonable
that the U.S. Supreme Court would have adopted the same interpretation
had the issue been brought squarely before it.'47
2.

The Close Link Between Culpable Conduct and Proximate
Causation Callsfor Their JointAnalysis

In many cases, questions of causation and fault are inseparable. 48 The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA), 149 adopted by two states and
invoked by many courts,' recognizes this. Section 2(b) of the UCFA
provides: "In determining the percentage of fault, the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 403-04.
145. Brandon, supra note 102, at 1031.
146. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 403-04, 404 n.7. These countries are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Greece, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the former U.S.S.R.,
Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Id.
147. The question of weighing both culpability and causation was not before the Supreme Court
because of the shipowner's failure to file a cross-petition. Id.at 401 n.2.
148. See, e.g., Afran Transp. Co. v. S/IT Maria Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621, 636 n. II (E.D. Pa.
1978) ("[T]he degree of culpability will often have a direct relationship to the degree of causation.").
149. Unif. Comp. Fault Act §§ 1-11, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1977).
150. Owen & Whitman, supra note 90, at 481 n.190. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act has
been adopted in Iowa and Washington. See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 668.1-668.16 (West 1989); Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 4.22.005-.925 (1998).
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extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed."'' The UCFA Comment to this section explains that degrees of
fault and proximate causation are invariably mixed.'52 At least one court
has noted the difficulty of analyzing relative culpability in the abstract
without also looking at how that culpability affected the plaintiffs
ultimate injury. 53 That same court acknowledged that the degree of
culpability will often have a direct impact on the degree of causation.'54
In the recent case of Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
declined to rule on which approach is better but hinted that there may be
55
no actual difference between fault and causation in this regard.'
Comparing proximate causation is therefore inescapable from a practical
point of view. 56 Laying down a rule that includes a proximate causation
comparison merely formalizes what actually occurs in practice.
The Ninth Circuit should endorse an approach that compares both the
parties' culpable conduct and causation in comparative fault analysis.
Adherence to the English formula for apportionment would be a starting
point for international uniformity and is a more realistic and practical
way of apportioning damages between parties who are both at fault.
IV. CONCLUSION
When injury or death occurs, seamen or their representatives have
several actions available to them to recover against the persons liable for
such injury or death. The two rules that the Ninth Circuit has developed
in this area do not comport with the legislative and judicial intent of both

151. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 2, 12 U.L.A. 135.
152. Unif. Comp. Fault Act § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 137.
153. See Afran Transp., 450 F. Supp. at 636 n. 11.
154. Id.
155. 517 U.S. 830 (1996). The Court noted:
Some commentators have suggested that there may be a distinction between a system allocating
damages on the basis of comparative culpability, and a system allocating damages on the basis
of both comparative culpability and the degree to which fault proximately or foreseeably
contributed to an injury. We continue to use the term "comparative fault" employed in Reliable
Transfer, but we do not mean thereby to take a position on which of these systems is the
appropriate one, assuming that there is in fact a distinction between them.
Id. at 837 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
156. Owen & Whitman, supra note 90, at 481-82. This is especially true in those remedies based
on unseaworthiness and strict products liability where defendant's fault is not an issue and courts
have no choice but to compare proximate causation.
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providing liberal remedies for seamen and fostering international
uniformity.
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to disregard the seaman's contributory
negligence when the seaman's employer has violated an OSHA
regulation, even in the absence of an applicable Coast Guard regulation,
is misguided. The Ninth Circuit should follow the other circuits that have
held that an employer who has violated OSHA regulations is precluded
from raising the worker's contributory negligence to mitigate the
employer's damages under FELA. This will advance Congress's
objectives of enlarging remedies available to seamen and holding the
industry responsible for providing safe working conditions.
The Ninth Circuit should adopt a rule comparing the parties' fault and
causation. Given that facts relevant to the issues of both fault and
causation are closely interwoven, this rule is more realistic. Furthermore,
the adoption of such a rule would put U.S. law in accord with that of
many other nations, including England. This would discourage
transoceanic forum shopping and advance the U.S. Supreme Court's
objective of achieving international uniformity in maritime law.
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